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Abstract. Supply chain (SC) management aims to increase the overall profit through 
improvement of various activities and components. Many contradictions between parts 
and different levels of a SC have been identified in order to achieve overall objectives. 
Such shortfalls may result in decreased strength and competitiveness of the SC. This 
paper considers the main conflicts related to inventory, pricing and marketing costs in an 
unlimited three-echelon supply chain. Aimed at avoiding a profit decrease, the research 
focuses on finding an equilibrium between inventory, pricing and marketing cost of an 
unlimited three-echelon SC. On each level, the best leadership option with the greatest 
payoff is sought for between K retailer, M manufacturer and S supplier. According to 
Stackelberg non-cooperative game theory, each SC level can become a decision-making 
leader depending on the available negotiating power. Consequently, three leadership types 
are modelled on each level and the total SC profit is calculated and compared to ascertain 
the best option. The authors of the article found that transfer of leadership from a retailer 
to supplier results in reduction of the total profit. In addition, the research focused on the 
main effects of parameters used in leadership models. Finally, validation of the proposed 
model was examined by simulation and Arena software, which indicated that models 
based on a game theory were performed accurately. 
Keywords: supply chain, non-cooperative game, Stackelberg game, design of experiment, 
simulation models. 
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1. Introduction
A management construct cannot be effectively used by practitioners and researchers 
if no uniform definition exists. Such is the case with the term “supply chain manage-
ment”, which has numerous definitions and little consensus on what it means (Mentzer 
et al. 2001). Supply chain paradigms of today have predominated over the field of 
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business (Mentzer 2001). During the late 1950s, Forrester and his colleagues at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology developed a number of underlying ideas and 
theories (Blanchard 2010). The Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals 
(CSCMP) defines supply chain management (SCM) as the planning and management of 
all activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion and all logistics manage-
ment activities (Stank et al. 2005). Many researchers believe that in the last decades, 
competition between companies has turn into competition between their supply chains 
(Jespersen, Larsen 2005).
Considering the role and importance of SCM, this concept is faced with many chal-
lenges and problems. Although no comprehensive model of SC issues exists, a literature 
review indicates that researchers are mostly interested in relevant information systems, 
marketing, financial management, logistical and organisational matters (Wang et al. 
2007). 
SCM is mostly focused on improving operations and increasing profits; thus, conflicting 
goals and objectives of two or more SC levels may result in problems for all levels and 
impact on the total profit. Numerous conflicting objectives of different components and 
levels may results in decreased strength and competitiveness of the entire supply chain. 
This paper considers the main conflicts related to inventory, pricing and marketing costs 
in an unlimited three-echelon SC. The game theory considers goals of all levels and 
players, which makes it a suitable and reliable tool for solving conflicting situations. 
On each level, the best leadership option with the greatest payoff is sought for between 
K retailer, M manufacturer and S supplier. According to Stackelberg non-cooperative 
game theory, each SC level can become a decision-making leader depending on the 
available negotiating power. Consequently, three leadership types are modelled on each 
level and the total SC profit is calculated and compared to ascertain the best option. 
Different models of leadership based on non-cooperative Stackelberg game theory are 
proposed to find the best option considering unlimited SC with three levels and three 
decision variables, namely inventory, marketing cost and pricing. The research considers 
shortages and incremental behaviour of a manufacturer as well as undertakes sensitiv-
ity analysis by design of experiment and validation of proposed models by simulation, 
which are its key contributions.
The paper is structured as follows: first, literature review is offered on SC coordination 
using game theory; next, assumption, steps and methodology pertaining to developed 
models are presented; then, variables and parameters are described. Three different lead-
ership methods and three mathematical model based on non-cooperative game theory 
are then presented considering three types of negotiating power. The best leadership 
option is found simulating numerical examples with the help of design of experiment 
(DOE). 
2. Literature review
As per definition, supply chain consists of all parties directly or indirectly involved in 
fulfilling a customer need (Chopra, Meindel 2007). This process involves all activities 
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required to turn raw materials into a final product that is delivered to a customer (Gu-
mus, Guneri 2007). Such activities and functions include new product development, 
marketing efforts, various other operations, distribution, financial and also customer 
services. A typical supply chain involves a variety of stages such as customers, retailers, 
wholesalers, distributors, manufacturers and raw material suppliers (Chopra, Meindel 
2007).
The main game theory concept was devised by mathematical researchers from Argentina 
and Japan in 1940s. It was first used to prove theories with the help of mathematics and 
calculus. Later, it was applied in economics, industry and other practical sciences (Ras-
musen, Blackwell 2005). In 1950, John Nash presented equilibrium for cooperative situ-
ations (Nash 1950a). He also developed a model for bargaining problems (Nash 1950b); 
and a year later, he presented an equilibrium point for non-cooperative situations (Nash 
1951). This research is primarily concerned with the use of game theory in general and 
non-cooperative Stackelberg games in particular in supply chain management. Review 
of similar researches suggests that:
1. Some scientists have focused on the use of Nash equilibrium point in supply chain 
coordination by the use of profit sharing contract (Feng et al. 2007; Jiazhen, Qin 
2008; Feng 2008; Ying et al. 2007; Jaber et al. 2006; Bai, Wang 2008; Xu, Zhong 
2011; Liu, Zhang 2006; Wang et al. 2009). 
2. Others used Nash and Stackelberg games and compared their results in supply 
chain coordination and cooperation problems (Leng, Parlar 2010; Arda, Hennet 
2005). 
3. Many focused on the use of other kinds of coordinating contracts such as buyback, 
rebate, cost sharing, profit sharing discount models, option contracts and benefit 
sharing in multi-echelon SC problems (Cachon, Lariviere 2005; Yali, Zhanguo 
2010; Chen, Zhang 2008; Cao et al. 2007; Cachon, Lariviere 1999; Zhang, Huang 
2010; Cachon, Lariviere 2001; Leng, Parlar 2009; Xiao, Qi 2008; Chen, Xiao 
2009; Xiao et al. 2007; Stein, Ginevicius 2010a; Stein 2010). 
4. Some used Shapley value equilibrium and Eliasberg model for coordination and 
cooperation problems in SC (Bahinipati et al. 2009; Zhao et al. 2010; Leng, Zhu 
2009). 
5. Finally, some papers focus on other optimisation tools such as queuing theory, 
Markov chain, backward induction, stochastic programming and genetic algorithm 
for solving coordination and cooperation problems in a supply chain, mostly in 
incomplete information games situations (Cachon, Kok 2010; Hennet, Arda 2008; 
Stein, Ginevicius 2010b; Zhen et al. 2006; Kaviani et al. 2011; Gupta, Weerawat 
2006). 
3. Research methodology and assumptions
Main steps used for the selection of leadership in an unlimited three-echelon supply 
chain are presented in Figure 1.
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3.1. Assumptions
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2. The product demand function depends on a price and marketing costs. This func-
tion is non-linear n nn r MD k P C
−α β= ⋅ ⋅ , thus standard deterministic inventory 
models are used. Alpha considers negative price behaviour in the model devised 
by the article authors (Abad 1994; Lee 1993; Lee et al. 1996; Kim, Lee 1998; 
Jung, Cerry 2001; Jung, Cerry 2005; Esmaeili 2008; Jaafarnejad et al. 2012).
3. In case of a manufacturer, shortages and stockout are allowed; consequently, short-
age costs are considered during the stockout period. The total relative cost for the 
manufacturer when producing incrementally, are calculated as provided below 
(Oganezov 2006; Wang, Tang 2009; Chakrabortty et al. 2010; Chang 2008; Pen-
tico et al. 2009; Jaafarnejad et al. 2012):
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In terms of this research, pricing, inventory and marketing costs are the decision vari-
ables. 
4. Production unit cost is a nonlinear function 
nP nC u D
−γ= ⋅  which is related to the 
demand and decreases with growing demand (Bazaraa et al. 1993).
5. Each manufacturer sells a specific product to a specific retailer. However, suppliers 
sell their raw materials to any manufacturer as needed. 
6. Irrespective of the level of the supply chain, to which it belongs, each player has 
a reasonable behaviour and opts for higher profit and lower cost.
7. As every player can act as a leader based on dominance and negotiating power, 
three types of leadership are considered. 
Fig. 1. Research methodology
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3.2. Notations
Table 1 provides variables and parameters used for models that are designed in follow-
ing section. 
Table 1. Variable and parameters
Description Note Description Note
Ordering cost from s to n
snOC Retailer’s margin Gr
Production function parameters u, γ Selling price from r to a customer nrP
Manufacturer holding cost nhC Selling price from n to r Pn
Manufacturer stockout Bn Product demand Dn
Manufacturer’s stockout cost nBC Marketing cost for product n nMC
Manufacturer’s margin Gn Price and marketing and demand coefficient k, a, β
Manufacturer’s total revenue
nTR Retailer’s setup cost rnsC
Manufacturer’s total cost
nTC Manufacturer’s production quantity nrQ
Manufacturer’s production capacity PCn Holding Cost coefficient for a retailer 'nk
Supplier’s margin GS Retailer’s total revenue TRr
Supplier’s total revenue TRS Retailer’s total cost TCr
Supplier’s total cost GS Retailer’s total payoff Zr
Supplier’s unit cost for each unit of 
raw materials GS
Raw material coefficient in product n
nsk
Holding coefficient cost for a 
supplier sSk




Manufacturer’s variable cost for each 
product nSC
4. Modelling process
Based on the research methodology and using assumptions and notations described in 
previous sections of the article, the primary model for each player is identified. A retailer 
(r) confronts holding and setup costs as well purchasing cost from manufacturer. In ad-
dition, to participate in a supply chain, a retailer should have a positive sales margin. 
Finally a retailer’s income involves the revenue achieved by selling goods to the final 
customer. Considering the above, retailer’s payoff function and its constraints are pre-
sented in (2) (Jaafarnejad et al. 2012). 
 1 '
1( . . [ . ])
2n n n n rn nnr r M r n M S r n nr
Max Z k P C P P C C Q Q k P−α β −= − − − − × × × ,
 s.t: 




nr nP P− ≥ , 
 0
n nn r MD k P C
−α β= ⋅ ⋅ ≥ , 
 n nD PC≤ , (2)
 0, 1, 0 1, 1k > α > < β < α −β > .
Manufacturer’s (n) confront holding, setup, ordering and stockout as well as purchasing 
and production costs. On the other hand, a manufacturer receives revenues from selling 
the final product to a retailer in large amounts. The production is incremental; in addi-
tion, unit production costs are related to products sold to a retailer. In 2012, Jaafarnejad 
et al. proposed a manufacturer’s model, which does not include unit production costs 
while computing gross revenues in an objective function; consequently, the model be-
came unbounded in many situations. Consequently, the authors of the article considered 
this problem and revised the manufacturer’s model. It was noticed that manufacturer and 
retailer leadership model has to be revised due accordingly. Considering the aforemen-
tioned, manufacturer’s payoff function and its constraints are shown in (3). 
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Suppliers confront costs related to holding, setup, ordering as well as purchasing or 
acquiring raw materials. In contrast, every supplier gains revenues by selling raw ma-
terials to manufacturers depending on their usage for production. Considering the afore-
mentioned, a supplier’s payoff function and constraints are depicted in (4) (Jaafarnejad 
et al. 2012).
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Each player of a three-level supply chain acts in its best interest when playing a game. 
Considering reasonable behaviour of each player as well as Nash best response princi-
ple, the best decision for each player of a three-echelon SC is identified by derivation 
of the payoff function to decision variables. The first order condition of each payoff 
function is used for the best response and the second condition is used for concavity 
analysis. By calculating the determinant of Hessian matrix for each player depending on 
its decision variables, it can be concluded that all models are concave to their decision 
variables; thus, optimal solution for the proposed models are definable. Table 2 repre-
sents the best response for each player if Nash principle is used, by calculating the first 
order condition of each player’s payoff function according to their decision variables. 
Once modelling is completed and the best response for each player is found, it is time to 
finalise the research and produce the leadership model for coordination of a three-level 
supply chain by Stackelberg non-cooperative approach. As three levels are included in 
the SC game, three types of leadership are possible. Each level – a supplier, manufac-
turer and retailer – can act as a leader while the remaining two would play the role of 
a follower. In this research, based on a make of a system and type of a supply chain, 
three leadership followership systems were considered. The main objective is to max-
imise the total profit based on the best response of followers. Consequently, the sum of 
leader payoffs will be the objective function and the best response of followers will act 
as constraints. The aforementioned basic constraints are considered in other models as 
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Fig. 2. Leadership types
4.1. Retailer leadership according to stackelberg model
The first model describes the situation with retailers as leaders and manufacturers and 
suppliers as followers. The objective function insist on maximising the retailer’s profit, 
first four constraints explain the rational behaviour of followers and the remaining con-
straint describes the logic of the game, namely: demand should exist and the selling 
price established by each player for the next level should be greater than the purchasing 
price from previous level. Other relevant information is presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Retailer leadership situation
Inputs Condition/Model Outputs Figure
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4.2. Manufacturer leadership according to stackelberg model
The first model describes the situation where manufacturers act as leaders while retailers 
and suppliers are followers. The objective function insists on maximising the manufac-
turer’s profit, first three constraints explain the rational behaviour of followers and the 
remaining constraint describes the logic of the game, namely: demand should exist and 
the selling price established by each player for the next level should be greater than the 
purchasing price from previous level. Other relevant information is presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Manufacturer leadership situation
Inputs Condition/Model Outputs Figure
' '
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4.3. Supplier leadership according to stackelberg model
The first model describes the situation where suppliers act as leaders while manufactur-
ers and retailers are followers. The objective function insists on maximising the sup-
plier’s profit, first five constraints explain the rational behaviour of followers and the 
remaining constraint describe the logic of the game, namely: demand should exist and 
the selling price established by each player for the next level should be greater than the 
purchasing price from previous level. Other relevant information is presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Supplier leadership situation
Inputs Condition/Model Outputs Figure
' '
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Considering the models mentioned above, for sensitivity analysis and leadership selec-
tion, a three-echelon supply chain including 2 suppliers, 2 manufacturers and 2 retail-
ers was designed. Table 6 indicates the numerical values of parameters in a proposed 
supply chain.
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To select the best type of leadership and analyse the sensitivity of the total profit, five 
constants were selected from demand and production nonlinear functions including
, , , ,α β γ k u . The lower and upper bounds of these five elements are provided in Table 7. 







Using design of experiment (DOE) and pk−2 experiments as well as including one 
central point in each block, 17 different experiments were designed with the help of 
MINITAB 16.5 software. The experiments are presented in Table 8. 
P. Jia et al. Leadership selection in an unlimited three-echelon supply chain
629
Table 8. Types of experiments
Design γ U K α β
1 0.01 4 4000 1.2 0.15
2 0.1 2 3000 1.2 0.05
3 0.01 4 3000 1.2 0.05
4 0.1 4 3000 1.25 0.05
5 0.1 4 4000 1.25 0.15
6 0.1 4 3000 1.2 0.15
7 0.055 3 3500 1.225 0.1
8 0.01 4 3000 1.25 0.15
9 0.1 2 3000 1.25 0.15
10 0.01 2 3000 1.2 0.15
11 0.01 2 3000 1.25 0.05
12 0.1 4 4000 1.2 0.05
13 0.01 2 4000 1.2 0.05
14 0.1 2 4000 1.2 0.15
15 0.01 2 4000 1.25 0.15
16 0.01 4 4000 1.25 0.05
17 0.1 2 4000 1.25 0.05
The experiments listed in Table 7 were used in all three leadership models. The models 
were coded, debugged and solved using LINGO 11. The total profit in case of each dif-
ferent type of leadership was calculated. The results are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9. The total profit of the supply chain by type of leadership
The total profit of the supply chain


















Using the two paired test, results of all three types of leadership in a supply chain were 
compared. The results from MINITAB 16.5 software are provided below. The authors 
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of the article concluded that retailer leadership ranked first and manufacturer and sup-
plier leaderships ranked second and third, respectively. Consequently, it is proposed that 
if negotiating power increases by moving from the end of chain to the beginning, the 
total profit would decrease.
Paired T-Test and CI: ZSC(R); ZSC(N) 
Paired T for ZSC(R) – ZSC(N)
 N Mean StDev SE Mean
ZSC(R) 17 2233 599 145
ZSC(N) 17 1681 487 118
Difference 17 551.6 116.1 28.2
95% lower bound for mean difference: 502.5
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0): T-Value = 19.59 P-Value = 0.000
Paired T-Test and CI: ZSC(R); ZSC(S) 
Paired T for ZSC(R) – ZSC(S)
 N Mean StDev SE Mean
ZSC(R) 17 2233 599 145
ZSC(S) 17 1639 485 118
Difference 17 593.1 118.2 28.7
95% lower bound for mean difference: 543.1
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0): T-Value = 20.69 P-Value = 0.000
Paired T-Test and CI: ZSC(N); ZSC(S) 
Paired T for ZSC(N) – ZSC(S)
 N Mean StDev SE Mean
ZSC(N) 17 1681 487 118
ZSC(S) 17 1639 485 118
Difference 17 41.46 15.40 3.74
95% lower bound for mean difference: 34.94
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0): T-Value = 11.10 P-Value = 0.000
The main effects of each leadership game in terms of five critical elements were cal-
culated using MINITAB 16.5 software. The results are provided in figures of Table 
10. In all models, Gama and U have the least effect and K, Alpha and Beta have the 
greatest, which indicates that the sensitivity effect of a price and marketing changes on 
SC profit is greater than unit production costs. K has a direct effect on all three leader-
ship models while Alpha has an inverse effect on the retailer leadership, and Beta has 
an inverse effect on the manufacturer and supplier models. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the increase in the selling prices would bring down the total profit; in addition, 
while the manufacturer and supplier act as leaders, increase in marketing cost would 
decrease the total profit as they would be making the first impact, which would require 
the retailer to invest more in marketing in order to gain a greater market share, based 
on demand equation. 
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Verification of different types of proposed leadership models based on non-cooperative 
game theory was delivered considering assumptions of models. For this purpose, a 
simulated supply chain was designed by Arena software, based on data from the afore-
mentioned numerical example. The simulated model is demonstrated in Fig. 3. The 
simulated model is based on random marketing costs and a random retailer price, each 
retailer has a supply chain. By this randomisation, the demand of each product is com-
putable and other decision variables are reached using the best response of each player 
calculated in the previous section, depending on Nash equilibrium definition. 
The simulated model performed 100 runs for each type of experiment and the results 
are given in Table 11. As results suggest, the total profit of the supply chain in case of 
the proposed leadership model is similar to the total profit of SC based on Arena, where 
retailer is the leader. The SC total profit is always between the upper and lower bounds 
of the confidence interval. 
Table 11. Model verification results in 17 experiments
Experiment Retailer leadership 
model








Design 1 3,432.21 3,302.76 153.22 3,149.54 3,455.98
Design 2 1,838.18 1,832.81 85.30 1,747.51 1,918.11
Design 3 1,800.10 1,810.25 83.98 1,726.27 1,894.23
Design 4 1,370.40 1,400.66 64.99 1,335.67 1,465.65
Design 5 2,506.56 2,457.33 114.00 2,343.33 2,571.33
Design 6 2,554.22 2,640.80 114.16 2,526.64 2,754.96
Fig. 3. Arena-based retailer leadership, a simulated model
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Experiment Retailer leadership 
model








Design 7 2,129.12 2,100.36 97.44 2,002.92 2,197.80
Design 8 1,851.76 1,820.40 84.45 1,735.95 1,904.85
Design 9 1,878.19 1,827.09 84.76 1,742.33 1,911.85
Design 10 2,568.25 2,461.21 114.18 2,347.03 2,575.39
Design 11 1,394.95 1,400.12 64.95 1,335.17 1,465.07
Design 12 2,442.21 2,431.24 112.79 2,318.45 2,544.03
Design 13 2,469.80 2,429.41 112.71 2,316.70 2,542.12
Design 14 3,455.26 3,307.45 153.44 3,154.01 3,460.89
Design 15 2,528.73 2,459.10 114.10 2,345.00 2,573.20
Design 16 1,844.17 1,879.58 87.21 1,792.37 1,966.79
Design 17 1,890.24 1,882.27 50.00 1,832.27 1,932.27
6. Conclusion
The research considered coordination in multi-echelon supply chains, in which non-co-
operative game theory was used as a suitable tool for coordination of pricing, inventory 
and marketing expenditure policies in a three-level supply chain where the leadership 
changed depending on negotiating power. The situation and assumptions used in this pa-
per will be valuable for future researches. In case of more levels, researchers are guided 
towards a comprehensive model, which would need to be coordinated in the future. In 
addition, as the competency of information and also complete information sharing in 
different levels seems to be impossible, using incomplete or imperfect game theory 
approaches such as signalling game or Nash Bayesian game would solve this problem 
and allow for more realistic options in the future. As interaction between layers in SC 
occurs continuously, repetitive games would adapt and fit real situations. This type of 
games considers time and patience of players within a modelling process. 
The coordination mechanism used in this paper is based on leader follower Stackelberg 
game. It must be noted that other kinds and coordination options such as a profit shar-
ing contract, revenue sharing contract, buyback contract and also option contract are 
all possible solutions for establishing coordination, Thus, the total profit and each stage 
profit would increase and bring more competitive advantages for the entire chain. The 
aforementioned contracts are all based on probabilistic demand function. Finally, Opt 
Quest application in Arena software is a suitable tool for estimating the best amounts of 
nonlinear model parameters. By identifying the optimal amount of the proposed models, 
optimal solution for unlimited three-echelon supply chain would be developed. 
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